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Andrew Heard* The Expulsion and Disqualification
of Legislators: Parliamentary
Privilege and the Charter of Rights
This article examines whetherthe Charter of Rights limits the ability of legislatures
to expel sitting members and to disqualify individuals from running for election.
The discussions reveal the uncertain breadth of the constitutional status that the
Supreme Court of Canada accorded legislative privilege in New Brunswick
Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speakerof the House of Assembly). The author
argues that both explusion and disqualification should be included among the
privileges that are beyond the Charter's purview.
Introduction
A particularly knotty problem for democracies lies in what to do with
rotten apples who are, or want to be, members of the legislative barrel. An
important part of any robust democracy must be the maintenance of
integrity among those holding public office and of the general public's
confidence in their government institutions. Thus, there may come a time
when legislative assemblies have to face the prospect of expelling a
member for behaviour which undermines their fundamental integrity.
Another troublesome embarrassment can arise when someone recently
found guilty of a corrupt practice or serious crime runs in an election.
Canadian legislatures have tried to prevent such candidates from seeking
office for a set period of time after their conviction. While the legislatures
used to have a free rein in dealing with expulsions and disqualification,
the Charter ofRights added a new dimension to the problem by proclaim-
ing in section 3 that every Canadian citizen has the right "to be qualified
for membership" in both the national and provincial legislatures. As a
result, the courts have a larger role to play in scrutinizing expulsions and
disqualifications from the legislatures, in order to ensure that individuals
are not unjustifiably denied their right to run for office. In hearing
challenges under the Charter on these issues, however, the courts are
faced with one of the oldest constitutional battles between judges and
legislators: the nature and extent of parliamentary privilege.
* Political Science Department, Simon Fraser University.
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I. Charter Cases on Expulsion, Disqualification,
and Privilege
Since the Charter came into force, there have been at least five expul-
sions-all from provincial assemblies-and two of these individuals
have sought redress from the courts. Billy Joe MacLean fought his
expulsion and successfully overturned his five-year ban from running for
office in Nova Scotia, while Fred Harvey continues to fight a disqualifi-
cation from running in an election to reclaim the seat he was expelled
from in the New Brunswick Legislative Assembly.' These cases invite a
closer examination, for they reveal the web of problems associated with
the legislatures' powers to expel and disqualify members from office.
Intricately involved with these cases are the constitutional privileges
of legislatures to determine who may sit as members. In the context of the
Charter claims made by MacLean and Harvey, the courts are put in a
position of assessing the nature of these privileges and their limits. With
the Supreme Court of Canada's 1993 ruling in New Brunswick Broad-
casting2 that the Charter generally does not apply to parliamentary
privileges, a legislator would not be granted relief under s. 3 of the
Charter if the expulsion or disqualification can be properly characterized
as an exercise of these privileges. If the legislature's privileges are not
involved, however, the courts must undertake a detailed examination of
the justifications for expulsion and disqualification in order to resolve the
Charter claim. Even in the latter event, a discussion of the legislative
privilege of an assembly to control its membership provides an insight
into the values that need to be balanced in a Charter analysis. A review
of the MacLean and Harvey cases helpfully illustrates the matters which
the courts should account for in weighing the constitutionality of expul-
sion and disqualification.
Billy Joe MacLean was a cabinet minister in Nova Scotia at the time
of being charged under the Criminal Code with forging documents to
claim $22,000 from the House of Assembly. He subsequently pleaded
guilty and was sentenced to a day in jail (served by his court appearance)
and a fine of $1,500 on each of four counts. Within four weeks of his
sentencing, the legislature reconvened in a special session to pass an Act
which expelled him from the House and set up a general prohibition
1. MacLean v. Nova Scotia (A.G.) (1987), 35 D.L.R. (4th) 306 (N.S.S.C., T.D.) [hereinafter
MacLean); Harvey v. New Brunswick (A.G.) (1993), 109 D.L.R. (4th) 371 (N.B.C.A.)
[hereinafter Harvey (C.A.)]; leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada granted (June 3,
1994), Bulletin of Proceedings 939 (S.C.C.), LaForest, Sopinka and Major JJ.
2. Donahoe v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (sub nom: New Brunswick Broadcasting
Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House ofAssembly)), [ 1993] 1 S.C.R. 319 [hereinafter New
Brunswick Broadcasting].
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against individuals convicted of indictable offences punishable with
more than five years' imprisonment from standing for election for at least
five years.' MacLean took this to court and won a favourable decision
from Chief Justice Glube of the province's Supreme Court Trial Division.4
In her decision, Glube C.J. distinguished between the provisions of the
Act which provided for the expulsion of sitting members and those which
disqualified anyone from running for a seat in the House for five years.
She reviewed evidence of a variety of constitutional authorities to
conclude, "The power to expel a member has long been a part of the
prerogative of Legislatures."5 Furthermore, she decided that there was no
conflict between the exercise of this power and s. 3 of the Charter:
I agree that proper standards for its sitting members may be set by the
House. In my opinion, s. 3 deals with the right to vote and the right to be
elected and that is different from setting standards for sitting members. In
my opinion, no breach of s. 3 occurs by the House expelling one of its
members.6
3. An Act respecting Reasonable Limits for Membership in the House of Assembly, S.N.S.
1986, c. 104. Section 2 of this Act expressly removed MacLean from office "by reason of his
conviction on four counts of using forged documents in respect of money received by him in
his capacity as a member." The Act also added the following provisions to the House of
Assembly Act:
25A(1) A person who stands convicted of an indictable offence that is punishable by
imprisonment for a maximum of more than five years is not eligible
(a) to be nominated as a candidate for election as a member of the House; or
(b) to be elected as a member of the House,
for a period of five years from the date of the conviction and, if the sentence imposed for the
offence substituted by a competent authority has not been fully served at the end of that period,
for the further time remaining to be served in that sentence.
(2) Where a conviction has been set aside by a competent authority, any disability imposed by
this section is removed.
25B Where a person who is a member of the House is convicted of an indictable offence that
is punishable by imprisonment for a maximum of more than five years, that member forthwith
ceases to be a member, and the seat of that member is deemed to be vacant until an election is
held in that electoral district according to law.
24C For greater certainty, Sections 25A and 25B apply in respect of persons convicted before
as well as after the coming into force of those sections.
The House of Assembly Act, R.S.N.S. 1992 (Supp), c. I has re-numbered s. 25A as s. 22 and
s. 25B as s. 23; s. 24C has been deleted.
4. For summaries and brief comments on this decision, see A. Donahoe, "The Right to
Choose: Candidates' Eligibility Test Questioned in Canadian Court" (1987) 68 Parliamentar-
ian 128; J. Holtby, "The Legislature, the Charter, and Billy Joe MacLean" (1987) 10 Canadian
Parliamentary Review 12.
5. MacLean, supra note 1 at 314.
6. Ibid. at 315.
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Thus, the House was within its rights to expel MacLean from office.
However, Chief Justice Glube took quite a different view of the disquali-
fication from running for office. She believed that the disqualification
went beyond the traditional privileges of a legislature to discipline its
members. In her view the Act was punitive and excessive by denying both
expelled members and other prospective candidates their right to stand as
candidates. She seemed particularly irked by the way the Act denied the
electorate the opportunity to decide who they could vote for: "Surely the
citizens of this province should be given the credit for having the sense
to determine who is a proper member."7 As a result she declared to be 'null
and void' the disqualifications embodied in the new sections added to the
House of Assembly Act. MacLean then ran in the by-election held in his
riding and was re-elected by a narrow margin.
Fred Harvey won a seat in the New Brunswick Legislative Assembly
in the 1991 general election. He was later convicted and fined $100 under
the Elections Act 8 for having induced a minor to vote, knowing her to be
under-age. Because of this conviction, however, he was expelled from the
Assembly and barred from running as a candidate for five years.
Harvey went to court seeking relief under the Charter to overturn his
expulsion and disqualification. He succeeded in obtaining a judgment
from the Queen's Bench which declared the disqualification provisions
of the Elections Act to contravene s. 3 of the Charter, although the
expulsion was upheld.9 He took the case to the Appeal Court, seeking a
declaration that the expulsion was invalid as well, but the appeal on that
point was dismissed without hearing arguments from the respondent
Attorney General. However, the Court did proceed with the cross-appeal
by the Attorney General, which dealt with the first part of s. 119(c),
disqualifying those convicted of corrupt or illegal practices from election
to the Assembly.
7. Ibid. at 318.
8. R.S.N.B. 1973, c. E-3. The relevant provisions of the Elections Act read:
119. Any person who is convicted of having committed any offence that is corrupt or
illegal practice shall, during the five years next after the date of his being convicted, in
addition to any other punishment by this or any other Act prescribed, be disqualified
from and be incapable of
(a) being registered as an elector or of voting at any election,
(b) holding any office in the nomination of the Crown or of the Lieutenant-
Governor in Council, or
(c) being elected to or sitting in the Legislative Assembly and, if at such date he
has been elected to the Legislative Assembly, his seat shall be vacated from the
time of such conviction.
9. Harvey v. New Brunswick (A.G.) (1993), 133 N.B.R. (2d) 181 (Q.B.) [hereinafter Harvey
(Q.B.)].
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Although the majority opinion by Ryan J.A. discussed both expulsion
and disqualification together, the judgment of the case had to be restricted
just to disqualification, which was the point of contention. The focus was
on the long-standing legal rules, both common law and statutory, in
Canada and Britain, that have disqualified individuals from standing for
election because of convictions for corrupt electoral practices, felonies,
or treason. Ryan J.A. then went on to conduct a full examination of the
issues under the Charter, and he concluded that while disqualification
infringed the right to be a candidate in s. 3 it was justified under s. 1 to
defend the integrity of the democratic process. The goal of s. 119(c) is, in
his view, "to ensure the proper exercise of citizens' political rights free
of corruption, intimidation, and similar illegal activities."1 According to
the majority, the provisions of the Elections Act only infringed s. 3 in a
limited manner that was proportional to the objective.
Justice Rice dissented from his colleagues' judgment, and concluded
that disqualification from candidature could not be justified under s. 1 of
the Charter. He dismissed the argument that disqualification was impor-
tant to prevent a "revolving door" of those expelled from the Assembly.
In a sentiment reminiscent of Glube C.J. in MacLean, he said: "I fail to
sees. 119(c) as having that societal importance and as being 'pressing and
substantial' when Harvey's right to a seat in the Legislative Assembly
will be resolved and decided by the electorate in a democratic election in
the exercise of their fundamental right to vote under s. 3 of the Charter.""
In these two cases, judges have been faced with laws relating to the
three aspects of expulsion and disqualification: the expulsion of a sitting
member of a legislative assembly, the disqualification of an expelled
member from seeking re-election, and the disqualification of non-mem-
bers from running for office for a period after conviction for certain
offences. While both the New Brunswick and the Nova Scotian courts
directly addressed the first two of these circumstances, neither delved
deeply into the third in their reported decisions.
These two cases reveal a need to study expulsion and disqualification
more closely. In neither set of decisions was equal attention given to the
grounding that both expulsion and disqualification have in a privilege
asserted for centuries in Westminster-style parliamentary systems: the
right of the legislative assembly to decide who may sit as a member.
10. Harvey (C.A.), supra note 1 at 381.
11. 1bid. at 377.
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These issues ought to be studied in light of the Supreme Court of
Canada's decision in New Brunswick Broadcasting'2 on the nature and
constitutional status of legislative privileges. A fuller understanding of
the context of legislative privilege is required for a proper analysis of the
relationship between expulsion and disqualification and s. 3 of the
Charter, especially since MacLean was decided six years before New
Brunswick Broadcasting; and the Harvey decision makes no reference to
it. The contextual setting New Brunswick Broadcasting provides is vital,
since it established that legislative privileges may be exempted from the
Charter. If disqualification or expulsion are in essence matters of inher-
ent legislative privilege, then they cannot be subordinated to s. 3 of the
Charter.
In New Brunswick Broadcasting, the Supreme Court was faced with a
claim by the media to record the proceedings of the Nova Scotian House
of Assembly with their own hand-held cameras, as a part of the freedom
of the press under s. 2(b) of the Charter. The Speaker managed to wn the
case by claiming that the Assembly had an inherent privilege to control
admittance to the chamber and exclude 'strangers'. This argument
succeeded because the majority of the Court believed that legislative
privileges possessed a constitutional status that made them immune to
judicial scrutiny under the Charter.
An initial debate revolved around whether the Charter could apply to
the federal and provincial legislative assemblies, or just to 'the legisla-
ture', which is composed of the governor and the deliberative chamber(s).
Chief Justice Lamer adopted the position taken in obiter by McIntyre J.
in Dolphin Delivery: "legislation is the only way in which a legislature
may infringe a guaranteed right or freedom."' 3 However, he was alone in
this position, and all the other members of the deciding panel agreed that
it was possible for the Charter to apply to the constituent parts of the
legislature. Justice McLachlin was vague about the breadth of the
Charter's application, although she made it clear that provisions such as
the requirement for an annual sitting (s. 5) and the use of English and
French in Parliament and the New Brunswick Legislative Assembly
(s. 17) only made sense if the Charter applied in some way to the
deliberative chambers. 4 Justice Cory took a much broader approach in
12. New Brunswick Broadcasting, supra note 2. For a general discussion of this case see A.
Heard, "The Supreme Court Entrenches Parliamentary Privilege out of the Charter's Reach:
Donahoe v. CBC" (1993) 4 Constitutional Forum 102.
13. RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery, [19861 2 S.C.R. 573 at 599 as cited by Lamer C.J. in New
Brunswick Broadcasting, supra note 2 at 358.
14. McLachlin J. did not need to definitively settle the extent of the Charter's application,
since she excluded the Charter in the case at hand on other grounds.
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his dissenting opinion, arguing that legislative assemblies were inher-
ently involved in governance and were the sort of 'public actors' which
the Court had deemed the Charter applied to in McKinney; 15 in his view
all actions of legislative bodies should be subject to the Charter.
The manner in which the majority applied the Charter to legislative
chambers, however, was not broad enough to bring all aspects of their
work into judicial scrutiny under the Charter. McLachlin J.'s decision
examined the historical basis of legislative privilege and held that
Canadian legislatures had acquired in their colonial origins those aspects
of British parliamentary privilege "which were necessary for the mainte-
nance of order and discipline during the performance of their duties.' 16
While the colonial assemblies' narrower range of privilege was said
to exclude the full punitive powers of British parliamentary privilege, it
still encompassed the essential immunity from judicial review. As
McLachlin J. described the current powers of the courts over parliamen-
tary privilege:
The only area for court review is at the initial jurisdictional level: is the
privilege claimed one of those privileges necessary to the capacity of the
legislature to function? ... The courts may determine if the privilege
claimed is necessary to the capacity of the legislature to function, but have
no power to review the rightness or wrongness of a particular decision
made pursuant to the privilege.' 7
The majority adopted the position that the Charter did not alter this
fundamental right of the legislative assemblies to regulate their own
affairs. This was a position taken out of concern for a fundamental
separation of powers between the three branches of government:
Our democratic government consists of several branches: the Crown, as
represented by the Governor General and the provincial counterparts of
that office; the legislative body; the executive; and the courts. It is
fundamental to the working of government as a whole that these parts play
their proper role. It is equally important that each show proper deference
for the legitimate sphere of activity of the other.'8
In the British parliamentary tradition, legislatures are absolute arbiters of
their internal affairs. However, the Charter of Rights has potentially
disturbed this independence in Canada. Since the Charter is part of the
'Supreme Law' which the courts must enforce, legislative bodies would
not apparently be able to infringe the Charter without risking losing their
immunity from judicial review.
15. McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229.
16. New Brunswick Broadcasting, supra note 2 at 380.
17. Ibid. at 384-85.
18. Ibid. at 389.
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Under the logic of the Constitution, however, the legislature's tradi-
tional immunity from judicial scrutiny could be assured in two ways: if
the Charter did not apply to the legislative assemblies asserting these
privileges, or if the privileges were given formal constitutional status.
The majority opted for the second approach. Justice McLachlin's major-
ity opinion held that the parliamentary system alluded to in the preamble
to the Constitution Act, 1867 necessarily entailed an independence from
the Crown and judiciary for the legislatures in their internal workings. In
her view, the subjection of an exercise of these parliamentary privileges
to judicial scrutiny under the Charter would negate the very essence of
this independence and immunity. The grounding of a constitutional status
in the 1867 preamble provided the basis for according to legislative
privileges an immunity from the Charter, under the principle articulated
in the Education Act Reference: 19 the Charter cannot invalidate another
part of the Constitution of Canada.
But the question arose whethey the immunity of these pYiWileges was
changed if they remain to be asserted by resolution in the chambers, or if
they become embodied in statutes, which are normally subject to the
Charter. McLachlin J. settled this issue by saying, "inherent constitu-
tional privileges can enjoy constitutional status regardless of whether
there exists power to legislate in respect of privilege in the provincial
constitution, and regardless of whether provisions relating to privilege
have in fact been enacted."20
The wording of the majority decision in New Brunswick Broadcasting
is vague about the extent of Canadian legislative privilege, but it certainly
protects assertions of privilege from Charter scrutiny if they involve
'inherent' necessities for the legislature's 'proper functioning'. In this
aspect, the majority relied on the principle developed in leading British
cases, such as Stockdale v. Hansard1' McLachlin J. summarized the
effect of recognizing the necessity of a claimed privilege:
The test of necessity is not applied as a standard for judging the content of
a claimed privilege, but for the purpose of determining the necessary
sphere of exclusive or absolute 'parliamentary' or 'legislative' jurisdic-
tion. If a matter falls within the necessary sphere of matters without which
the dignity and efficiency of the House cannot be upheld, courts will not
enquire into questions concerning privilege. All such questions will fall to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the legislative body.2"
19. Reference Re Bill 30, an Act to Amend the Education Act (Ont.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148
[hereinafter Education Reference].
20. New Brunswick Broadcasting, supra note 2 at 374.
21. (1839), 112 E.R. 1112 (Q.B.).
22. New Brunswick Broadcasting, supra note 2 at 383.
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The net result of New Brunswick Broadcasting is that the courts can
assess a claim made under the Charter in order to determine whether the
alleged infringement has arisen from some rule or action necessary to a
legislative assembly's proper functioning. If a court decides that such is
the case, then the policy or action in question is one of legislative privilege
that may be immune from Charter review.
Justice McLachlin was at pains to take this position one step further,
in order to clarify whether the courts could still review a particular
application of a recognized privilege. In order to answer this question she
used the illustrations of the Education Act Reference23 and the Electoral
Boundaries Reference. 4 In the first case, the Supreme Court decided that
the legislative exercise of Ontario's power to implement religiously
organized education could not be subject to the Charter. The rationale is
that the legislation was necessary to give effect to the power conveyed in
the Constitution to the province; to strike down the religious discrimina-
tion found in the proposed Education Act would negate the legislature's
ability to exercise that very power granted by the Constitution. In
contrast, the Court ruled that legislation implementing a province's
constitutional power to set electoral boundaries could be subject to the
Charter. In this second instance, the scrutiny of a particular boundaries
scheme did not logically negate the power to define constituencies.
According to the majority in New Brunswick Broadcasting, the analogy
from the Education Act Reference was the most relevant to the judicial
review of exercises of legislative privileges. At the heart of legislative
privilege is the protection of a legislative body's independence to
determine its internal affairs without judicial interference. The courts
cannot review particular applications of a recognized privilege without
negating this most essential character of that privilege. All the courts can
do is inquire whether the policy or action is part of a privilege that is
necessary to the functioning of the legislature; the courts cannot question
the wisdom of a particular way that privilege is exercised.
A number of important issues emerge from New Brunswick Broad-
casting that have direct relevance to the constitutionality of expulsion and
disqualification. The most fundamental point is that expulsion or dis-
qualification could be immune from a challenge under s. 3 of the Charter
if they can be properly described as aspects of legislative privilege.
23. Education Reference, supra note 19.
24. Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158 [hereinafter
Boundaries Reference].
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II. Expulsion of Sitting Members
The Charter does not seem readily applicable to a legislative assembly's
expulsion of a member. The right in s. 3 of the Charter to be "qualified
for membership" in a legislature is most clearly read in the sense given
by Glube C3. in MacLean;25 it refers to the right of a citizen to be a
candidate rather than to their rights in the legislature once elected.
However, other judges might well give this phrase as expanded a reach
as the Supreme Court of Canada gave to the "right to vote" in the same
section; while a plain reading of that phrase would seem to refer to the
actual casting of a ballot, the Court has declared that it also entails a right
to "effective representation" that must be reflected in the relative sizes of
constituencies.16 The Supreme Court could also possibly decide that the
right to be qualified for membership in a legislature also entails the right
to remain a member until resignation or electoral defeat. In such a case,
the Court will have to consider the effect on s. 3 of a legislative
assembly's constitutional privileges. If expulsion is a matter of the
"inherent privileges" required by a legislature for its proper functioning,
then it cannot be subject to the Charter.
As outlined by McLachlin J. in New Brunswick Broadcasting, a court
is entitled to question whether a claimed privilege actually exists. The test
for such an inquiry is whether the alleged privilege is "necessary" to a
legislative body's proper functioning: "If a matter falls within this
necessary sphere of matters without which the dignity or efficiency of the
House cannot be upheld, courts will not inquire into questions concerning
such privilege."27 Past conflicts between legislatures and the courts reveal
that necessity can be very much in the eye of the beholder. As has been
said about the British context, "There may be at any given moment two
doctrines of privilege, the one held by the courts, and the other by either
House, the one to be found in the law reports, the other in Hansard."28
A cautionary reminder to judges trying to assess an assertion of
privilege is found in the very case that laid down the principle of
necessity, Stockdale v. Hansard.29 The British House of Commons had
declared by resolution that parliamentary privilege protected the publish-
ers of parliamentary debates from libel suits. But in a subsequent libel
25. MacLean, supra ivate t at 3 15. Sertioti 3 of the Charter -t Rights states "Every citizet
of Canada has the right to vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or of a
legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership therein."
26. Boundaries Reference, supra note 24.
27. New Brunswick Broadcasting, supra note 2.
28. F.H. Lawson & D.J. Bentley, Cases in Constitutional Law, 6th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon,
1979) at 255.
29. Supra note 21.
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suit, the judges declared that the courts may review this assertion of
privilege, and then went on hold that the parliamentary privilege protect-
ing free speech in the House did not extend to the publication of its
debates. This clash of what was necessary to the Commons' proper
functioning was resolved shortly after, when Parliament passed the
Parliamentary Papers Act, 184030 which expressly shielded published
versions of parliamentary debates. This statutory protection has become
a fundamental aspect of parliamentary privilege and has been instituted
in Canadian jurisdictions as well. In this instance, thejudges were plainly
mistaken in their view of what was necessary.
When judges conduct an independent assessment of the competing
arguments, they risk basing theirjudgment on an incomplete appreciation
of political realities. In considering the necessity of a claimed privilege,
judges should bear in mind two reasons why accepted parliamentary
privileges enjoy an immunity from judicial review: legislators are best
situated to judge what is necessary to the legislative process, and
legislators are accountable to the electorate for their decisions. When
faced with a claim to privilege, judges may have to defer at some point
to the legislature's judgment of what is necessary to its own dignity and
functioning. It should be sufficient for judges to ask whether the legisla-
tors have a sound argument, based on principle and practical concern, that
is directed to ensuring the basic integrity or efficient functioning of the
assembly. Judges should be leery of substituting their own assessment
unless the legislature's position is patently a cover for achieving general
social policies, or partisan interests, under the guise of parliamentary
privilege. This deference was plainly evident in the majority's applica-
tion of the test of necessity in New Brunswick Broadcasting; as McLachlin
J. concluded: "the legislative assembly always faces the ultimate sanc-
tion, that of the voters".31
A review of constitutional authorities reveals that Westminster parlia-
ments have long exercised the right to expel members. As Erskine May
wrote in 1863 of the British House of Commons, "No power exercised by
the commons is more undoubted than that of expelling a member from the
house as a punishment for a grave offence".32 Bourinot was equally
emphatic in his discussion of the subject in 1892:
30. (U.K.), 3 & 4 Victoria, c. 9.
31. New Brunswick Broadcasting, supra note 2 at 389.
32. E. May, Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings, and Usage of Parliament, 5th ed.
(London: Butterworths, 1863) at 58.
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The power of Parliament to expel a member is undoubted. This power has
been repeatedly exercised by the English and colonial Parliaments, either
when members have been guilty of a positive crime, or have offended
against the laws and regulations of the House, or have been guilty of
fraudulent or other discreditable acts, which proved that they were unfit to
exercise the trust which their constituents had reposed in them, and they
ought not to continue to associate with the other members of the legislature. 3
Modem authorities are just as firm in their conclusion that expulsion is an
accepted power of Westminster parliaments.34 Legislators have been
expelled for a wide variety of reasons, in Britain, Canada, and other
Westminster systems. Most often, some criminal conviction has sparked
the expulsion, but it has also occurred because a member has been
"offensive" rather than actually committing a criminal offence; for
example, a British MP was expelled in 1947 after he had published
unfounded accusations about drunken corruption in Parliament.35 The
right to decide who is fit to sit as a member is an ancient and broad right.
As a former Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel to the Canadian House
of Commons once said about the unlimited power of expulsion, "If the
House does not like the colour of a member's hair, they can expel a
member. 3 6 In 1884 a court refused to allow an appeal by an MP who was
excluded from the UK House of Commons; Coleridge C.J. said in the
case, "the jurisdiction of the Houses over their own Members, their right
to impose discipline within their walls, is absolute and exclusive".37
Alberta has set down in its Legislative Assembly Act a provision that
encompasses the full power of expulsion; s. 36 states, "The Assembly
may, after a hearing conducted in accordance with its standing orders,
expel a Member for any cause that is sufficient in the opinion of the
Assembly."3 8
33. J.G. Bourinot, Parliamentary Procedure and Practice, 2d ed. (Montreal: Dawson Bros.,
1892) at 193-94.
34. C.J. Bolton, ed., Erskine May's Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings, and Usage
of Parliament, 21st ed. (London: Butterworths, 1989) at 113; E. Campbell, "Expulsion of
Members of Parliament" (1971) 21 U.T.L.J. 15; W.F. Dawson, "Parliamentary Privilege in the
Canadian House of Commons" (1959) 25 Can. J. Eco. & Pol. Sci. 402; J. Maignot, Parliamen-
tary Privilege in Canada, (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982) at 161; M. Pelletier, "Privilege in the
Canadian Parliament" (1973) 54 Parliamentarian 143 at 148; O.H. Phillips & P. Jackson, 0.
Hood Phillips' Constitutional and Administrative Law, 7th ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell,
1987) at 242-43; E.C.S. Wade & A.W. Bradley, Constitutional andAdministrative Law, 10th
ed. (London: Longman, 1985) at 217.
35. Wade & Bradley, ibid. at 218.
36. House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Committee on
the Review of the Parliament of Canada Act (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 20 December 1989)
at 29.
37. Bradlaugh v. Gossett (1884), 12 Q.B.D. 271 at 275.
38. R.S.A. 1983, c. L-10.1.
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Expulsion can be justified on two grounds: in order to enforce
discipline within the House, and in order to remove those whose behaviour
has made them "unfit" to remain as members. With respect to discipline,
any assembly must have some ultimate sanction to ensure compliance
with its rules. Continued, wilful refusal to follow the rules and orders of
the House, or Speaker's rulings, and failing to attend any sittings of the
assembly are grounds for which members can ultimately be expelled.
Also, expulsion is reserved for those who have received outside payments
for their activities in the legislature.3 9 Removal of members in these
circumstances is needed as a disciplinary measure to ensure that the
business of the legislature is conducted efficiently and honestly.
Expulsion has also been exercised in order to remove members for
actions outside the legislature which render them "unfit" to continue
sitting. This is a significant concern with the many instances of legislators
committing bribery, corruption, fraud, and other serious misdeeds. Just
within the past decade, at least eighteen Canadian legislators were
convicted of criminal offences, including sexual assault, assault (on a
wife), and murder; while most resigned, a few hung doggedly on until
they were expelled by their assembly or defeated at the polls. 40 No
legislature can be venerated as an institution of governance if it is
populated with such unsavoury characters. Indeed, some would add that
the civic virtue of a society requires the removal from public office of the
corrupt, criminal, and profoundly immoral. The Saskatchewan Legisla-
tive Assembly was faced with the embarrassment of Colin Thatcher's
determination to remain a member after his conviction for the murder of
his wife. In order to protect its fundamental dignity, the Assembly
expelled him immediately after Royal Assent was granted to a law
explicitly empowering the removal of those convicted to more than two
years' imprisonment.4' In addition to the symbolic dimension, there is the
more practical consideration that some malefactors should be excluded
or expelled in order to prevent them from continuing their wicked ways
in office. Without some means to remove or exclude corrupt members, a
legislature runs the risk, at least, of losing public confidence in the
political process or, at worst, of becoming an institutional cover for
39. See e.g.: Parliament of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-I, s. 35.
40. Not every criminal conviction leads to pressures to resign. For example, Bernard Valcourt
retained his seat without much protest after his conviction for drunk driving, and Svend
Robinson has not been seriously challenged after being sentenced to a brief jail term for
criminal contempt of court. These instances are consistent with the general pattern that sees
expulsion or disqualification for criminal convictions that involved indictable offences only.
41. Legislative Assembly and Executive Council Amendment Act, 1984, S.S. 1983-84, c. 65.
See also the debate on the resolution to expel Thatcher: Saskatchewan, Legislative Assembly,
Debates and Proceedings (28 November 1984) at 3616.
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organized criminal activity aimed at exploiting the public purse. A
legislature must have the power to remove corrupt individuals in order to
maintain its fundamental integrity.
While there are broad powers to expel by resolution, expulsion can
have an explicit statutory basis as well. In every Canadian jurisdiction,
members who are found to have gained their seat through electoral
corruption are expelled. Various statutes also vacate the seat of a
legislator convicted of indictable offences. Those convicted to five years
in jail cannot continue to sit in any Canadian legislature under the
Criminal Code;42 Manitoba has a similar provision.43 As mentioned
earlier, Nova Scotia has a law which expels MLAs convicted of a crime
that could have been subject to a five-year term in prison." Quebec and
Saskatchewan have similar provisions which expel those sentenced to at
least two years' imprisonment for indictable criminal offences.45 British
Columbia legislation expels MLAs for a variety of reasons, including
conviction for "an infamous crime".46 The thresholds for expelling those
imprisoned for a criminal offence seem quite lenient, since a member
cannot act effectively during any significant period of incarceration.
A legislative assembly is the sole judge of the broad grounds for
expelling a member. As Joseph Maignot concludes, the precedents
establish that an exercise of this power is not subject to judicial review:
What is clear is that the ordinary civil and criminal jurisdiction of the courts
does not extend to determining the rights of members to sit in the House
and the courts equally have nothing to do with questions affecting
membership except in so far as they have been specially designated by law
to act in such matters as, for example, under the Dominion Controverted
Elections Act.47
One can firmly conclude that the privileges of Canadian legislative
assemblies include the power to expel their members. It is necessary to
both the discipline and integrity of any legislature that members may be
removed from office. Expulsion was not reviewable by the courts prior
to the Charter and is not now subject to the Charter, according to the ratio
of New Brunswick Broadcasting. In this light, the expulsion provisions in
New Brunswick's Election Act and in Nova Scotia's House of Assembly
Act have been properly upheld.
42. Section 748(2).
43. Legislative Assembly Act, R.S.M. 1990, c. L-110, s. 18(1).
44. Supra note 3.
45. National Assembly Act, S.Q. 1982, c. 62, s. 17; Legislative Assembly and Executive
Council Act, R.S.S. 1979, c. L-I 1.1, s. 40.1(1).
46. Constitution Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 62, s. 54; members are also expelled on a number of
other grounds, including bankruptcy and swearing allegiance to another state.
47. Maignot, supra note 34 at 161-2.
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III. Disqualification
While expulsion from a legislature may be clearly immune from Charter
scrutiny, disqualification from membership in a legislature raises a
number of conundra that reveal a certain vulnerability to Charter chal-
lenges. The complication with disqualification lies initially in deciding
whether it can be characterized as part of parliamentary privilege. This
analysis is troublesome because of a couple of problems: the ambiguity
of the 'test of necessity' for identifying a bona fide privilege; and the
uncertainty whether the full range of legislative privileges possessed are
"inherent" and, therefore, beyond the Charter's reach.
A further complication pervading these issues lies in translating
British jurisprudence on parliamentary privilege to the Canadian consti-
tutional stage. While the Supreme Court in New Brunswick Broadcasting
drew lessons from the treatment of privileges in British courts, the
majority paid no attention to the vital distinction in Britain between
privileges asserted by resolution and those effected by statute. British
courts developed the test of necessity to review privileges asserted by
resolution, but statutory embodiments of privilege remain completely
beyond judicial scrutiny.
If disqualification is a matter of legislative privilege, then it could be
saved from Charter scrutiny. Disqualification would qualify as a matter
of privilege if it were either a necessary means to realize full expulsion,
which is a privilege, or it could be a privilege in its own right. The New
Brunswick Attorney General argued in Harvey that disqualification from
membership was necessary to prevent a "revolving door".48 In one sense,
he is correct, since there are a number of examples in both Britain and
Canada of legislators being expelled, winning the ensuing by-election,
only to be expelled once again as still "unfit" for the legislature; in some
cases the expulsion and re-election cycle was repeated several times.49 A
legislature does not have conclusive authority to discipline its members
if it expels someone simply to have that person returned to carry on where
he or she left off. Disqualification would give finality to a disciplinary
decision to expel a member.
As a privilege in its own right, the justification for disqualification is
similar to that for expelling a sitting member for actions committed
outside the legislature. In both instances, the criminal or other illegal
activities impugn the individual's integrity and undermine the public's
faith in the legislature. Expulsion has mainly been used as a last resort to
48. Harvey (C.A.), supra note I at 375.
49. See Bourinot, supra note 33; May, supra note 32 at 60.
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remove members following serious convictions. But a murderer, rapist,
or fraud artist is no more suitable for public office because they are
convicted just before an election rather than afterwards. Thus, disquali-
fication prevents certain malefactors from standing as candidates for a
limited period following their conviction. Disqualification has been
exercised for a more limited range of activities than expulsion. Disquali-
fication has a statutory basis and automatically results from a conviction
for a specified range of offences.
In assessing the necessity of disqualification, a court would have to
decide whether "the dignity or efficiency" of a legislative assembly could
be maintained if it was not able to disqualify candidates from being
elected to the assembly. The justification for disqualification is the same
as that for some aspects of expulsion: the dignity and integrity of an
assembly would be seriously undermined if the corrupt could sit as
members.
A general head of privilege encompasses control over the internal
composition of the legislature, and this general area of privilege could
include disqualification as a specific privilege. Maignot has argued that
the control over composition is far reaching: "In the final analysis, the
House of Commons may exclude, suspend, or expel any member for any
reason."5 ° This power of the Commons even extends to being able to
exclude from the House someone who has just received a popular
mandate in an election." As Pelletier has written of the Canadian context:
Acceptance by the Commons is a test of which all Members must meet and
the Canadian House has on occasion rejected a Member notwithstanding
any legal qualification and regularity of his election.... The fact that the
House rarely questions the qualifications and fight of its Members is no
indication that an elected candidate does not have to meet the test of
acceptability to his colleagues. The authority of the House of Commons to
reject a fully qualified and properly elected Member has not been weak-
ened by time or disuse. 2
The authorities are clear that under parliamentary privilege, a legislative
body is in general control of its membership.
Discussions of disqualification and privilege are complicated because
British authorities have consistently held that expulsion does not create
any disabilities from running again in an election. 3 When British authori-
ties talk about expulsion creating no disqualification, however, they are
only dealing with the traditional exercise of expulsion by resolution.
50. Maignot, supra note 34.
51. See Bradlaugh v. Gossett, supra note 37.
52. Pelletier, supra note 34 at 149.
53. See e.g. Bolton, supra note 34; Wade & Bradley, supra note 34.
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They are correct that members expelled by a resolution of the House are
generally not disqualified from running in their own by-elections, since
the qualifications for candidature are set by statute. No single House of
Parliament can change the legal qualifications for candidature by a
resolution expelling one of its members. But that statement is quite
different from saying that disqualification cannot be a matter of parlia-
mentary privilege. While legislators may not be disqualified by the
resolution that expels them, they can be and have been disqualified by
statute; these statutory disqualifications may be an expression of privi-
lege.54 It is instructive to return to the edition of Erskine May written
shortly before Confederation. Writing in 1863, May says,
Another important power peculiar to the Commons, is that of determining
all matters touching on the election of their own members. This right has
been regularly claimed and exercised since the reign of Queen Elizabeth,
and probably in earlier times .... 11
This historical context is essential, since the privileges of most Canadian
legislatures are now based on those of the British House of Commons in
1867.56
There have been for centuries disqualifications to candidature, both in
Britain and Canada. For the last two centuries, disqualifications have
been based on statutory rules that prohibit one's candidacy for a limited
period after a conviction for a set range of criminal offences or corrupt
practices.5 7 Canada's Criminal Code5 8 includes a provision that disquali-
fies anyone sentenced to five or more years' imprisonment from being
elected until the punishment is served; Manitoba has a similar disqualifi-
cation.59 Nova Scotia adopted a five-year period of disqualification for
anyone convicted of a criminal offence that could have carried a prison
sentence of more than five years, regardless of the actual sentence; as
noted earlier, however, this provision was struck down in MacLean.60
Convictions for corrupt and illegal electoral practices have long been
automatic disqualifications in Britain and at both the national and
54. Bourinot recounts an instance where a member was expelled and disqualified by statute
in Lower Canada: Bourinot, supra note 33 at 195.
55. May, supra note 32 at 54.
56. 1871 in the case of British Columbia. See also infra note 82.
57. The British House of Commons had previously tried to bar certain candidates by
resolution, but that practice was abandoned after 1782 and disqualifications have since been
based on statute alone. In that year, the British House of Commons resolved to retract and
expunge the disqualifications it had placed on John Wilkes in 1769. See May, supra note 32.
Some jurisdictions add bankruptcy to the list of grounds for statutory disqualification.
58. Section 748(2).
59. Legislative Assembly Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. L- 110, s. 18(l).
60. MacLean, supra note 1.
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provincial levels in Canada.6 New Brunswick's disqualification for
corrupt electoral practices, at issue in Harvey, originally dates from
1791.62 And it is important to note that until the late 19th or early 20th
centuries, the House of Commons, and other Canadian legislative assem-
blies, acted as courts to hear and resolve allegations of electoral irregu-
larities and subsequent disqualifications. 63 While the trial of these matters
has since been delegated to the judiciary, the Canadian legislatures'
original domain in these matters stemmed directly from the British
Commons' privilege to determine the grounds for membership in the
House. The setting of disqualifications by statute would seem logically
to belong to this ancient privilege to determine matters relating to the
election of members.
Disqualifications for criminal offences, conflict of interest, and elec-
toral corruption involve the same justification: high public office should
be held only by individuals of integrity. Conviction for serious criminal
offences indicates a deep character flaw; time is needed wo demmnstTate
the rehabilitation necessary for confidence in that person's honesty.
Electoral corruption adds another dimension, in that it involves a subver-
sion of the very process which candidates seek to carry them to the
legislature. If candidates cannot even conduct their elections honestly,
there is no assurance that they will be any more trustworthy in office.
A strong argument emerges that Canadian legislatures may legislate
disqualifications from candidature as a matter of parliamentary privilege.
Certain disqualifications are necessary to the integrity and proper func-
tioning of Canadian legislatures. Public confidence in the legislature can
require the exclusion of individuals who have been proven to lack the
basic integrity needed to ensure trustworthy behaviour in office.
A counter argument flows from the positions taken by Glube C.J. and
Rice J.A. in MacLean and Harvey respectively, in which greater virtue is
seen in the electorate's judgment than in that of the legislative assembly.
In this perspective, the legislature is accorded the power to remove one
of its sitting members, but the voters are best suited to decide whether an
expelled member should be returned to office. It may be necessary for a
legislative body to expel a corrupt member, but it is not necessary to either
6t. See [P. Boyer, Election Law in Canada, the Law, Practice, and Procedure of Federal,
Provincial, and Territorial Elections, vol. 1 (Toronto: Butterworths, 1986) at 526-574; Lord
Hailsham ofMarylebone, ed., Halsbury's Laws ofEngland, vol. 5, 4thed. (London: Butterworths,
1990) at 543-46.
62. An Act for Regulating Elections, of Representatives in the General Assembly, and for
Limiting the Duration of Assemblies, in this Province (N.B.), 31 Geo, Il, c. 17, s. 8.
63. See N. Ward, "Electoral Corruption and Controverted Elections" (1949) 15 Can. J. Eco.
& Pol. Sci. 74.
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its dignity or functioning that an expelled member be denied the oppor-
tunity to face the electorate. The judgment of the electorate is even more
valued for those who have not been members of the legislature, but who
have committed some indiscretion prior to running for office. It is better
to rely on the voters in a riding to weigh the particular offence and its
circumstances in deciding whether that individual should hold public
office, rather than rely on automatic statutory disqualifications.
Unfortunately, a reliance on the democratic judgment of someone's
fitness for office is not without its own problems, which stem from
electoral realities. The reliance upon the electorate's judgment of a
candidate's suitability for office is at once appealing and troublesome. It
has the attraction of the democratic value that underlies the whole edifice
of representative democracy. It also runs headlong into the practical
problems of our electoral system. In MacLean, Glube CJ. struck down
the disqualifications involved by relying on a faulty assumption about the
way the electoral system works:
The content of s. 1 of the Act affects the rights of Mr. MacLean and others
to run and be elected. It also impinges on the rights of voters to elect a
member of their choice by majority vote. 64
Our electoral system does not require a winning candidate to have
majority support, only one vote more than the others. More frequently
than not, Canadian legislators win office with less than a majority of the
votes in their particular election. This situation was clearly illustrated in
the case of Billy Joe MacLean. With his partial victory before Glube C.J.,
Maclean ran in the by-election created by his expulsion from the House
and won. However, MacLean won with only 40 percent of the votes and
just 165 votes more than his nearest rival; almost 60 percent of the
electorate voted against MacLean. His victory can be accounted for by
the overwhelming support he won in just two polling districts, one of
which was the subject of disquieting allegations of impropriety.65 MacLean
had been expelled and disqualified by a statute passed without a single
dissenting vote on third reading, but he was re-elected by a minority in his
own riding. MacLean's minority election is far from unusual. A candidate
can win with about 30 percent of the vote in a hotly contested seat. For
example, Kim Campbell was defeated in the 1993 federal election by
Hedy Fry, who won with 31% of the vote in Vancouver Centre; Paul
Forseth won the New Westminster-Burnaby riding in the same election
64. MacLean, supra note 1 at 318 (emphasis added).
65. "Inverness opponents fogot high-tone compaign [sic] as Billy Joe moved ahead" Daily
News (28 February 1987) 14-15.
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with just 29% of the vote.6 While the first-past-the-post electoral system
is Canada's traditional electoral system and should not be simply dis-
counted by judges for its vagaries, the electoral system's inherent
weaknesses should be understood by judges who would othewise rest
their conclusions on imaginary virtues.
One must also realize that a corrupt, conniving, or indulgent minority
can be the group that carries a candidate to power. This should be a
particular concern when a candidate has been, or intends to be, actively
involved in exploiting public office for corrupt purposes. Many in the
constituency may well benefit from this corruption, others may turn a
blind eye. Especially in the small constituencies found in some provinces,
such people can have a significant impact on the final result of a close
race. While political corruption has drastically changed since Confedera-
tion in most communities, it would be the height of naivet6 to believe that
significant corruption can now be discounted as a practical concern.
The democratic counter-argument to disqualification is limited in its
emphasis on the judgment of a plurality of voters in one constituency.
This local focus fails to account for the discredit brought upon the whole
legislature by the presence of certain convicted offenders. This collective
harm poses problems to the democratic argument even in its most benign
manifestation, when a forgiving majority decides that they want as a
representative an individual recently convicted of some crime. However
benevolent the motivations which led to an offender's election, there still
remains the issue of the greater harm to the integrity of the whole
legislature caused by the presence of a recently proven criminal. These
concerns are all the more troubling when a criminal is elected by a small
minority. It is also important to remember that popularity is no substitute
for integrity and honesty. The election of a candidate does not simply
affect one riding, but the whole political community as well. Because of
all the potential risks, there is much to be said for the judgment of the
majority of a legislative assembly prevailing over that of a minority in one
constituency when it comes to questions of the basic integrity of the
legislature.
I would argue, therefore, that disqualification is a matter of legislative
privilege that is necessary to the basic integrity of the legislative process.
Indeed, an inability to disqualify those guilty of corrupt practices and
serious crimes would bring the legislature into disrepute.
66. Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, Thirty-fifth General Election 1993: Official Voting
Results, (Ottawa: CEO, 1993) at 1521 and 1446.
400 The Dalhousie Law Journal
IV. Statutory and "Inherent" Privileges
Even if disqualification is accepted to be a matter of privilege, a court has
to consider whether disqualification belongs to the group of privileges
that were granted constitutional status in New Brunswick Broadcasting.
There was an underlying implication in the majority decision that only
"inherent" privileges enjoyed constitutional status. This inherency is
referred to a number of times in the decisions and raises some particular
problems. Colonial legislative bodies were only recognized in the com-
mon law to have the "inherent" privileges necessary to their most basic
discipline and functioning. Thus, they lacked many of the privileges
legislatures currently possess, such as the right to require testimony under
oath by witnesses, the full powers to punish those they judge to be in
contempt of the assemblies, and the ability to deal with many transgres-
sions outside the precincts of the assembly. 67 They could only enjoy the
complete roster of privileges enjoyed by the British Parliament by
express statutory authority.
Thus, a question emerges about whether only the "inherent" privileges
of the pre-Confederation colonial assemblies enjoy a constitutional
status, or whether the full range of parliamentary privilege is a part of the
Constitution. The situation is clouded because of a lack of clarity in the
opinions written in New Brunswick Broadcasting. In his concurring
opinion Chief Justice Lamer clearly made the distinction between inher-
ent privileges and broader ones founded on statute: "The position which
I have advanced in these reasons holds that the members of the Nova
Scotia House of Assembly, in exercising their inherent privileges (which
are not dependent on statute for their existence), are not subject to Charter
review;" other privileges that have to be founded on statute would be
subject to Charter scrutiny.68 The majority opinion unfortunately does
not explicitly deal with the distinction, but it is evident by implication
throughout much of the discussion. A number of references are made to
the limited nature of the "inherent" privileges of colonial legislatures,
identified in judicial decisions and academic writings; only one passing
reference is made to the situation which has prevailed for over a
century-most Canadian legislatures have the full privileges of the
British House of Commons.
67. Maignot, supra note 34 at 4-7 and 152-84. Some leading cases on the privileges of
colonial assemblies are: Kielley v. Carson (1842), 4 Moo. P.C.C 63; Doyle v. Falconer (1866),
16 E.R. 293 (P.C.); Landers v. Woodworth, [1878] 2 S.C.R. 158; Barton v. Taylor (1886), 11
App. Cas. 197.
68. New Brunswick Broadcasting, supra note 2 at 365 [emphasis in original].
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I would argue that disqualifications aimed at protecting the basic
integrity of the legislative process can meet the test of inherent privileges,
which were "protective, defensive powers. '69 This conclusion might be
mistaken, however, as the Supreme Court of Canada has previously held
that, in one context at least, the protection must be directed towards "an
immediate obstruction".7 ° One must consider the reach of the constitu-
tional protection given to other privileges adopted by statute, because of
the importance of the statutory privileges all Canadian legislatures have
added since Confederation. The Supreme Court has left some fundamen-
tal puzzles in this issue, because there is no proper recognition in New
Brunswick Broadcasting that Canadian legislatures can legislate for
themselves whatever privileges they wish; most of the Court's analysis
dealt with British and colonial examinations of inherent privileges
asserted by resolution.
With the passage of the Colonial Laws Validity Act7 in 1865, colonial
assemblies were generally able to legislate for themselves what privi-
leges they wished, unless limited by other statutes. While the Canadian
Parliament came into being with the powers of the British House of
Commons in 1867, it was limited to those powers. As a result its 1873
Oaths Act 72 was disallowed, since the British Commons only acquired
this power to compel testimony under oath in 1871. Consequently, the
limiting provision of the Constitution Act, 1867 was amended in 1875 to
provide express statutory authority to the Canadian Parliament to grant
itself additional privileges.73 The Canadian House of Commons enjoys
the privileges of the British House of Commons, but this link to Britain
is now entirely discretionary. It is based on s. 18 of the Constitution Act,
18677' and s. 4 of the Parliament of Canada Act,75 but this British
69. This is the phrase used by the court in Barton v. Taylor, supra note 67 at 203.
70. Landers v. Woodworth, supra note 67 at 201-2.
71. (U.K.), 28 & 29 Viet., c. 63.
72. S.C. 1872, c. 1. For a review of the events involved, see: Pelletier, supra note 34 at 145.
73. Parliament of Canada Act (U.K.), 38-39 Vict., c. 38.
74. Section 18 states: "The privileges, immunities, and powers held, enjoyed, and exercised
by the Senate and by the House of Commons, and by the members thereof respectively, shall
be such as are from time to time defined by Act of the Parliament of Canada, but so that any
Act of the Parliament of Canada defining such privileges, immunities, and powers shall not
confer any privileges, immunlities, and powers exceeding those at the passing of such Act held,
enjoyed, and exercised by the Commons House of Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland, and by the Members thereof."
75. R.S.C. 1985, c. P-I. Section4 states:
"The Senate and the House of Commons respectively, and the members thereof
respectively, hold, enjoy, and exercise,
(a) such and the lile privileges, immunities, and powers as, at the time of the
passing of the British North America Act, 1867, were held, enjoyed, and exercised
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foundation is plainly within the competence of the Canadian Parliament
to amend or sever under s. 44 of the Constitution Act, 1982.76 The general
authority under the ColonialLaws Validity Act was used after Confedera-
tion by provincial legislatures, which also found the former powers of
colonial assemblies to be inadequate but were not expressly limited to the
British powers of 1867. This authority to expand the base of privileges
was explicitly upheld in a Privy Council case dealing with Nova Scotia's
statutory adoption of broader privileges.77 Nova Scotia claimed in 1876
the privileges of the Canadian House of Commons following a court
decision denying the Assembly the power to punish for contempt under
its original, inherent privileges. 78 For their own part, the provincial
legislatures may change their legislative privileges through the authority
they have under s. 45 to amend their own "provincial constitutions"; 79 the
Privy Council ruled in 1896 that legislative privileges were squarely
within the jurisdiction of a provincial legislature to amend the "provincial
constitution" found at the time in s. 92(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867.80
While McLachlin J. freely quoted Dawson's comments that colonial
legislatures only had inherent privileges, she failed to continue her
references into the post-Confederation period. Dawson had gone on to
say that legislatures have an "ability to define privileges and to assume
powers by statute, which ability is limited only by the general jurisdictions
by the Commons House of Parliament of the United Kingdom, and by the
members thereof, so far as the same are consistent with and not repugnant to that
Act; and
(b) such privileges, immunities, and powers as are from time to time defined by
Act of the Parliament of Canada, not exceeding those at the time of the passing of
such Act held, enjoyed and exercised by the Commons House of Parliament of the
United Kingdom and by the members thereof respectively."
76. Section 44 states: "Subject to sections 41 and 42, Parliament may make laws amending
the Constitution of Canada in relation to the executive government of Canada or the Senate and
House of Commons."
77. Fielding v. Thomas, [1896] A.C. 600.
78. The 1874 incident involved an MLA who refused to apologise for a libel against a
minister. The provincial Supreme Court emphasized the limited range of inherent privileges
in awarding damages to the MLA for the Assembly's attempt to remove him. In response, the
Nova Scotian legislature passedAn Act Respecting the Legislature of Nova Scotia, S.N.S. 1876,
c. 22; the Act provided in s.2 that the Assembly would enjoy the privileges of the Canadian
House of Commons. The suit was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, and it upheld the
original outcome; the new privileges, adopted after the incident, could not be relevant to that
decision: Landers v. Woodworth, supra note 67. The general provision relating to the House's
privileges is now found in the House of Assembly Act, R.S.N.S. 1992 (Supp), c. 1, s. 26(1).
79. Section 45 states: "Subject to section 41, the legislature of each province may exclusively
make laws amending the constitution of the province."
80. Fielding v. Thomas, supra note 77.
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of the legislative body."8 Since Confederation, Canadian legislatures
have been able to assign themselves by statute what privileges they
wish.82
The broader range of privilege has become as important to Canadian
legislatures as the earlier inherent privileges of the colonial era. Parlia-
ment and every provincial legislature have adopted by statute privileges
and powers beyond those originally held. Modem legislatures require
such basic powers as compelling testimony under oath, punishing for
contempt, and protection for publications of their debates, but these
privileges are legislated additions to the original privileges of colonial
assemblies. A full and flexible range of privileges is necessary for
legislators to rise to the challenges of governing in changing and unfore-
seen circumstances. All exercises of privileges, whether founded on
statute or common law, require protection from judicial scrutiny in order
to ensure that legislative assemblies are in command of all the affairs
necessary to their integrity and functioning. Circumstances have changed
dramatically since colonial times, and Canadian legislatures must not be
hamstrung by having their privileges locked into that era.
When the Supreme Court returns to parliamentary privilege, it will
have to deal more openly with the implications of its decision in New
Brunswick Broadcasting. The majority decision may have given consti-
tutional status only to the limited "inherent" privileges that Canadian
legislatures had as colonial assemblies. It examined the claim to privilege
by the Nova Scotia House of Assembly under the test of necessity, which
it properly did in that case where the privilege was asserted by resolution.
However, the language of the decision also implied that any assertion of
privilege will be subject to the necessity test. This is a fundamental
revolution in jurisprudence on parliamentary privilege, because legis-
lated privileges were not generally subject to judicial scrutiny. With the
doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, the British courts did not have to
81. R.M. Dawson, The Government of Canada, 4d ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1963) at 369 [emphasis in original]. The limitations referred to here can mean that provincial
legislatures might not be able to legislate directly on criminal matters as part of their privileges,
since jurisdiction over criminal law belongs to the federal Parliament; see Maignot, supra note
34 at 6-7.
82. New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island have adopted the
powers and privileges of the Canadian House of Commons, which are based on the those of
the British House of Commons in 1867. Alberta has tied its privileges directly to those of the
British House of Commons in 1867, while British Columbia has adopted the British privileges
of 1871. Any of the provincial legislatures that have based their privileges on those of another
body may also add other privileges or powers by statute. Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, and
Saskatchewan have defined a list of individual privileges by statute, but with no statutory
embrace of another chamber's privileges.
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consider whether this immunity could also be based on the nature of
privilege. One may no longer wish to embrace the complete judicial
immunity of legislated privileges in Canada, because that would mean
any matter clothed as privilege would escape Charter scrutiny. However,
it is important for the courts to recognize that the full range of privileges
should enjoy the same constitutional status. While the Supreme Court
must make clear at some point that statutory extensions of privilege can
also enjoy constitutional status, not just the limited privileges of pre-
Confederation assemblies, the Court should explicitly endorse the impli-
cation in New Brunswick Broadcasting that statutes embodying addi-
tional parliamentary privileges will be subject to the test of necessity
before being granted immunity from the Charter. This may be a change
in the status of legislated privileges that marks an acceptable compromise
to ensure the independence and powers of legislatures without permitting
a carte blanche exemption from the Charter of Rights. As a result,
statutory disqualifications would enjoy the same constitutional status as
other parliamentary privileges.
V. Disqualifications and s. 3 of the Charter
There is one final impediment to granting immunity from the Charter to
statutory disqualifications. While I have argued that disqualification
meets the test of necessity, and should be protected from Charter scrutiny
as a legislative privilege, it runs squarely against the wording of s. 3 of the
Charter. One can object loudly that judicial immunity for disqualifica-
tions would fundamentally negate that part of s. 3 which guarantees every
citizen the right "to be qualified for membership" in federal and provin-
cial legislatures; this right might have no force and effect. Even if
disqualification is accepted as a parliamentary privilege, s. 3 might be
exempted from the general rule that the Charter does not apply to these
privileges. In her judgment in New Brunswick Broadcasting, McLachlin
J. said, "Absent specific Charter language to the contrary, the long
history of curial deference to the independence of the legislative body,
and to the rights necessary to the functioning of that body, cannot be
lightly set aside. .83 The language of s. 3 of the Charter may be so
specific that it was clearly intended to apply to disqualifications. This line
of argument might be conclusive if all disqualifications were matters of
privilege and the right of candidature in s. 3 really would be left without
meaning. However, not all disqualifications may be matters of privilege.
There are a number of disqualifications based on age, residency, or
83. New Brunswick Broadcasting, supra note 2 at 372.
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occupation that cannot be justified as falling within those matters which
necessarily affect the integrity of the legislature. Section 3 can still have
effect if the privilege relating to disqualification is not defined too
broadly. Rather than concluding that control over all aspects of disquali-
fication is necessary to contemporary legislatures, one should establish
that the privilege permits legislatures to control just those aspects of
candidacy that go to the heart of their integrity and proper functioning.
Legislative privilege involves disqualification for criminal, electoral, or
conflict of interest offences, but not necessarily age, residency, and
occupation. With that narrower definition of disqualification as privilege,
s. 3 can still protect the rights of Canadians from a range of other
disqualifications while safeguarding parliamentary privileges.
This discussion would not be complete, however, if it did not also
consider the sort of analysis that would be necessary were a court to find
that disqualification is not part of the legislative privileges immune from
Charter scrutiny. In that case, specific disqualifications would be subject
to s. 1 testing to decide whether they are "demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society". The disqualifications resulting from serious
criminal or electoral offences are aimed at the important social objective
of ensuring integrity and public confidence in the legislative process. The
reasons for pursuing this objective have already been discussed in this
paper. The means chosen are also rationally connected to the objective,
by barring from the legislature those whose guilt has been proven by
conviction for corrupt or criminal offences.
There may be a question about the proportionality of the specific
disqualifications. The disqualifications in Canadian law range from a low
of the life of the current legislature (in Newfoundland); through the most
frequent ban of five years, to eight years for those guilty of corrupt
practices in Ontario or Alberta.84 In most cases, the periods of disquali-
fication have only limited consequences. In the case of a five-year
disqualification, the person will usually be banned for one general
election and occasionally two--depending on when the conviction
occurred in the legislative life-cycle. While the eight-year ban will most
often involve two elections, it may potentially involve three. A disquali-
fication from one election is the minimum necessary to give proper effect
to the objective, and one more election beyond the minimum does not
seem onerous. But the potential ban of three elections found with an eight-
year disqualification may be out of proportion to the good sought to be
achieved, particularly since this extensive ban applies regardless of the
84. Boyer, supra note 61.
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seriousness of the offence. The disqualification which Billy Joe MacLean
challenged in Nova Scotia is also problematic. While the five-year ban is
a reasonable period, it applied to anyone convicted of an offence with a
maximum sentence of five years, regardless of their actual sentence. This
general reach appears rather broad in failing to account for the seriousness
of the particular behaviour involved, but the disqualification is only
applicable to those convicted of indictable offences; by definition, these
are the most serious criminal charges. Therefore, most instances of
disqualification are in proportion to the objective, but a few might impose
unnecessarily harsh penalties.
One needs also to consider whether there are other reasonable alterna-
tives which could achieve the same objective with less impairment of the
right. The most frequently discussed alternative, allowing the electorate
to decide on a person's fitness for office, has a number of limitations
which have already been discussed. Essentially, this approach falls well
short of realizing the objective by failing to ensure that corrupt individu-
als do not hold office. Another option to a fixed period of disqualification
can be easily instituted for those convicted for criminal offences, as the
ban could extend until the person obtained a pardon. The granting of a
pardon is attractively linked to the objective of ensuring the integrity of
a legislature, since a pardon is official recognition that an individual has
regained their "good character". However, a number of potential candi-
dates would have to wait much longer than the usual disqualifying period
of five years' in order to obtain their pardon, as the pardon process is
dependent on, and in addition to, the length of one's sentence. The fixed
periods found in current statutes will often impose less onerous penalties
than the alternative method and are to be preferred.
Under a s. 1 analysis, therefore, most statutory disqualifications should
be upheld. It is quite justifiable to protect the integrity of the legislature
by excluding those individuals who have been recently found guilty of
corrupt or serious criminal behaviour.
Conclusion
Expulsion and disqualification provide important protection for the
integrity of Canadian legislatures. Confidence in the honesty with which
public affairs are conducted requires some means to remove or exclude
those recently convicted of corrupt or serious criminal behaviour. While
the Charter of Rights has altered many of the dynamics between the
courts and the legislatures, it does not appear to undermine fundamentally
a legislature's ability to throw out rotten apples or to keep them out.
Expulsion is safe from Charter scrutiny in being so firmly rooted in
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parliamentary privilege. Disqualification poses more of a complex set of
issues, but it also appears to be a matter of privilege. However, the
Supreme Court will have to clarify whether it is a matter of "inherent"
privilege that enjoys constitutional status. Given the opportunity, the
judiciary should decide that all matters of privilege be treated similarly.
Additional privileges provided by statute need to be saved from judicial
review if they are necessary to the basic integrity or functioning of the
legislative assembly; in such a case, statutory disqualifications aimed at
excluding the corrupt should possess the full immunity of other privi-
leges. In any event, disqualification is so essential to safeguarding the
integrity of the legislative process that most provisions excluding those
recently convicted of corrupt or serious criminal offences would survive
a challenge under the Charter.
